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Abstract
This paper explores the role of cheap excuses in product choice. If agents feel that they fulfill
one ethical aspect, they may care less about other independent ethical facets within product
choice. Choosing a product that fulfills one ethical aspect may then suffice for maintaining a
high moral self-image in agents and render it easier to ignore other ethically relevant aspects
they would otherwise care about more. The use of such cheap excuses could thus lead to a
“static moral self-licensing” effect, and this would extend the logic of the well-known dynamic
moral self-licensing. Our experimental study provides empirical evidence that the static
counterpart of moral self-licensing exists. Furthermore, effects spill over to unrelated, ethi-
cally relevant contexts later in time. Thus, static moral self-licensing and dynamic moral self-
licensing can exist next to each other. However, it is critical that agents do not feel that they
fulfilled an ethical criterion out of sheer luck, that is, agents need some room so that they
can attribute the ethical improvement at least partly to themselves. Outsiders, although
monetarily incentivized for correct estimates, are completely oblivious to the effects of moral
self-licensing, both static and dynamic.
Introduction
The production of green, environmentally sustainable products has been increasing. This phe-
nomenon includes products from organic agriculture [1, 2]and sustainably produced elec-
tronic items [3, 4]. However, even though consumers buy more green products, purchases
seem to fall short compared with the stated intents that consumers express. Experts have
argued that the ratio is one to ten: Spending on ethically improved products amounts to
approximately 10% of what consumers claimed they would be willing to spend [5]. Moreover,
data suggests that many consumers attempt to ignore ethically questionable production stan-
dards when possible [6]. This finding suggests that although many consumers have some
awareness of ethical problems in production processes and some willingness to pay (WTP),
cheap excuses may be welcome when regarding opting for less-ethical items.
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Some brands, such as Wholefoods, foster a universal approach toward production that
adheres to high, broad ethical standards. By contrast, many companies have focused on one
ethical facet of their products while remaining rather silent on others. For example, fashion-
producer H&M advertises that it replaces conventional cotton in its “conscious collection”
with organic or recycled cotton [7]. In a similar manner, Apple publicly announced to audit of
all its suppliers regarding the use of conflict minerals [8]. However, even though H&M and
Apple have included the well-being of their workers in their codes of conduct [9–11], empha-
sizing its importance, reports of problematic working conditions have been repeatedly
observed. For example, articles by Duhigg and Barboza [12], Burke [13]and Fullerton [14]
have highlighted problematic working conditions in the production of Apple products, and
Preston and Leffler [15] reported workers’ rights violations among some of the best-ranked
suppliers of H&M.
We follow Bandura [16] and Gert [17] and define moral and ethical behavior as avoiding
harm to other people and/or the environment. For a company, focusing on improving one eth-
ical facet of their production process compared with many might be easier. For example, textile
producers might limit environmental damage from growing cotton but ignore other ethically
relevant aspects of their production processes. What might also be is that some facets such as
environmental impact are easier to address than other facets such as labor and safety stan-
dards. This may partly explain why many companies stress specific ethical aspects to increase
their ethical reputation. Another reason for such practices could be that they serve customers’
moral interests. Maybe, for customers, fulfilling one ethical aspect is sufficient to ease their
moral conscience when buying a product. Potentially, for many product decisions, “a little
good is good enough.” If so, the need to improve other ethical facets may become irrelevant
for companies as soon as they address one aspect.
In three experiments, we explore whether subjects care comparatively less about another
ethical, unrelated dimension as soon as one ethical aspect of a product appears to be fulfilled.
For this purpose, in so-called Product treatments, we randomize subjects into different condi-
tions and elicit their WTP for improved manufacturing standards of textile products. Subjects
make decisions on towels in neutral colors and of a comparable size and weight (grammage of
the cotton used). If they opt for a towel manufactured under certified conditions, they receive
less money for themselves. Subjects make real economic decisions, that is, they receive a towel
and money in the end, depending on their decisions in the study. Thus, in line with Levitt and
List [18], we employ a real item to increase the outside validity of our economic experiments.
We also elicit beliefs on how other subjects may behave in an incentivized manner. In all
experiments, we follow the standards of economic experiments that have been described in
Charness and Fehr [19] and Falk and Heckman [20].
In all treatments, the instructions inform subjects that manufacturing (i.e., sewing towels)
is a production step unrelated to generating the raw material, in our case cotton, and that the
two production steps often occur in different countries. Thus, whether a towel is made from
conventional versus organic cotton has nothing to do with the manufacturing standards in the
sewing step. Nevertheless, our data shows that the WTP for secure working standards in the
sewing process is highly significantly smaller if subjects know that they decide between towels
made from organic cotton instead of conventional cotton. The organic cotton is observed
operate as a type of moral excuse to care less about the workers’ conditions in the sewing
sector.
Next, we explore whether fulfilling one ethical dimension (organic cotton) also has spill-
overs to another, unrelated ethical context later in time and find the following. In our study,
approximately half an hour after the main part of the experiment, in which the subjects’
focused on towels, they are offered the opportunity to share money with refugees from a local
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refugee camp. We find that subjects who know they will receive a towel made from organic
cotton after the experiment donate less than subjects who know their towel will be made from
conventional cotton. Again, organic cotton is observed to serve as an excuse to not care about
another, ethically relevant context. We observe these effects even though subjects most likely
knew that the refugee crisis was drastic when the experiments occurred, and that all help was
needed to cope with it [21, 22].
Potentially, we find these static and dynamic moral spillovers because for the subjects, all
ethical behaviors load on one and the same personality factor: “being an ethical person.” Aker-
lof and Kranton [23] argue that identity may play a critical role from which people derive posi-
tive utility. Falk and Szech [24] demonstrate that people care about their moral identity.
However, maybe fulfilling one ethical aspect is sufficient for a decent moral identity and a posi-
tive self-image[25, 26].
Knowledge of these effects could be a critical first step to discussing social implications.
Therefore, we incentivize new, independent subjects to predict the behavior of subjects in our
original product choice treatments. Our data shows that these outsiders are completely
unaware of the effects of static moral self-licensing, and they underestimate moral spillover
effects in time. Potentially, outsiders follow a different moral compass and consider different
product facets and contexts over time as what they are, namely, unrelated regarding conse-
quences. Thus, outsiders do not anticipate that subjects, when weighing self-interest against
something morally relevant, may prefer to find some type of moral excuse for self-oriented
behavior.
The question arises as to whether self-attribution is critical for the small moral excuses we
identify. Therefore, we run two additional treatments identical to the original product choice
treatments, respectively, with one difference: The instructions stress and visually illustrate that
it is perfectly random whether a subject makes decisions about towels made from conventional
or from organic cotton. In this manner, organic cotton may become a less valid, self-attribut-
able excuse to not care about sewing conditions and refugees, and this is indeed what we find.
Studies of economic institutions in which agents make morally relevant decisions are a
pressing and strongly growing field within economics. Recent contributions from economics
include Sobel [27], Falk and Szech [28], Kirchler et al. [29], and Pigors and Rockenbach [30]
on market trading and morals. Falk and Szech [31] and Rothenhäusler et al. [32] have studied
morals in group voting. Kerschbamer et al. [33], Bartling et al. [34], and Friedrichsen and
Engelmann [35] have considered ethical consumption and/or morally relevant credence
goods. Our results indicate that consumers’ moral excuses should receive specific attention in
follow-up research.
Literature review
Our results relate to the classic moral self-licensing effect. However, we explore a static deci-
sion context, whereas the classical literature on moral self-licensing has focused on dynamic
effects only. Researchers have documented that ethical behavior in the past serves as a justifica-
tion to act less ethically later. Such dynamic moral self-licensing was first described by Monin
and Miller [36] in the contexts of racism and sexism in a two-stage experiment. Subjects had
to make a hypothetical job decision in a neutrally framed environment. In one treatment
group, the best applicant was African American, and in the other group, the best applicant
was white. After making their decision, all subjects were confronted with another hypothetical
hiring scenario: A chief of police had to hire a new deputy in a racially charged job environ-
ment. All subjects were asked to rate whether the job was better suited for a white or a black
person. Subjects with the opportunity to present themselves as non-prejudiced before were
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significantly more likely to prefer a white person now. Thus, subjects who could demonstrate
they were not racist in the first step, tended to prefer the white police applicant later. A second
study by Monin and Miller [36] yielded similar findings in the field of sexism.
Sachdeva et al. [37] found that subjects use dynamic moral self-licensing to justify selfish
behavior. Subjects asked to write positive short stories on their good past deeds were later
observed to be more selfish than others regarding making a real donation to charity. In a
related study, Mazar and Zhong [38] demonstrated that subjects who acquired “green” prod-
ucts in the first step are more likely to cheat for personal gain and steal later compared with
subjects who could only acquire conventional products in the first step in time. For more
examples of dynamic moral self-licensing, see Merritt et al. [39].
Another closely related concept from the field of behavioral economics is conscience
accounting, proposed in Gneezy et al. [40]. In the first stage of their experiment, subjects could
lie to increase their profit at the expense of their fellow players. In stage two, subjects had the
opportunity to make a small donation to charity. The authors observed that the share of dona-
tions was significantly higher among the subjects who lied in stage one compared with those
who told the truth. This finding suggests that by donating, subjects atone for past moral norm
violations. Furthermore, the share of donations among the liars decreases significantly if the
time delay between the two stages increases. A possible explanation for this finding is that the
memory of an individual’s own unethical behavior fades over time. Another finding is that
subjects are more likely to lie if they know that they have the opportunity to donate later. This
leads to the conclusion that people set off their future ethical behavior against their current
ethical behavior, and this conclusion is in line with the idea that all types of moral behavior
may load on one aspect of personality if subjects can attribute those moral improvements to
themselves [24, 25, 26]. The authors also documented that a comparatively cheap future possi-
bility of “compensation” might be sufficient for subjects to maintain a high moral self-image.
What differentiates this approach from ours is that in our Product treatments, subjects
make decisions on the static moral improvement (the upgrade to the fair wear towel at the dis-
pense of different monetary amounts) in a price list. They do not know which of their deci-
sions the computer will randomly select when they decide to donate money to refugees a half
an hour later. Moreover, the subjects are unaware of the opportunity to make a donation
beforehand. This design enables the subjects to focus on whether deciding about towels made
from organic instead of conventional cotton is sufficient to care less about other ethically rele-
vant aspects—static and dynamic.
Design of the study
We explore the effects of moral self-licensing across different ethical facets in purchase deci-
sions and across different points in time. To this end, we implement a product choice regard-
ing different towels and a subsequent donation situation. In addition to behavior, we study
beliefs of outsiders about the behavior of decision-makers to analyze whether beliefs of outsid-
ers are in line with real choice behavior. Therefore, we conduct four treatments: Product Con-
trol, Product Organic, Belief Control, and Belief Organic.
In our experiment, we employed towels for the following three reasons. First, the value of
the fashion industry is USD trillions, encompassing a wide variety of companies [41] and
employs over 57 million people worldwide [42]. Thus, this sector is a critical industrial sector.
Second, the bulk of the production occurs in developing and newly industrialized countries,
such as China, India, Vietnam, Bangladesh [43, 44], and the textile industry has often been the
focus of consumers’ demand for improved production standards. Third, we specifically used a
product that we hoped most subjects found useful, independent of personal characteristics
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such as gender or taste in fashion. Therefore, the subjects made decisions about towels in neu-
tral colors.
Product treatments
In Product Control and in Product Organic, subjects made ethically relevant product deci-
sions. Subjects were randomized into the two treatments. They choose between ethically differ-
ent yet otherwise comparable towels. In a price list, they weighed money and receiving a more
conventionally produced towel against receiving no money and a towel that fulfills a more eth-
ical set of production standards. The subjects choose between towels in neutral colors; in a
standard, medium size of 100 cm x 50 cm, and with a standard surface weight of approximately
450 g/m2.
Belief treatments
In Belief Control and in Belief Organic, we elicited in an incentivized manner outsiders’
beliefs about the behavior of the subjects in Product Control and in Product Organic, respec-
tively. The Belief treatments provided information on what the uninvolved third parties, who
did not make the decisions, predicted about the individuals involved. Subjects were randomly
assigned to the two Belief treatments. For organizational reasons, randomization in this study
was at the session level.
In all treatments, the instructions informed subjects of the different ethically relevant
dimensions in the production of textiles such as towels. We focused on two important, sepa-
rate aspects. First, the cotton used could be conventional or certified “organic.” Here, we relied
on the well-known Global Organic Textile Standard (GOTS) and the Organic Content Stan-
dard (OCS), which certify the organic origin of cotton. All subjects knew from the instructions
that the certified organic cotton was produced without the use of agrochemicals, such as syn-
thetic pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers commonly used in conventional production and
that pollute the soil. Second, the manufacturing conditions under which workers must work
when sewing the towel can be certified by the well-established Fair Wear Foundation (FWF),
or not. The FWF is a well-established, independent non-profit organization that aims to
improve labor standards in factories based on the conventions of the International Labour
Organization (ILO). Subjects were informed that under these FWF conditions, safety, eco-
nomic living standards, and political rights of workers are monitored. These benefits are not
guaranteed in conventional production. Indeed, on the topic of ethics, the textile and garment
industry is one most frequently discussed industries, e.g., Danzer and Grundke [45].
The instructions also provided information on the fragmentation of production chain in
the garment industry, that is, the cotton is typically grown and manufactured in different
countries. Thus, subjects knew that these two aspects, growing organic cotton and ensuring
FWF-controlled manufacturing standards, could be considered separate from each other.
To analyze moral self-licensing within product decisions, we elicited the monetary value
subjects assigned to the FWF manufacturing standards in Product Control and in Product
Organic. In Product Organic, subjects knew that the towel already fulfilled another indepen-
dent, ethically relevant criterion (i.e., organic cotton). Decisions were elicited in a price list.
Subjects choose between a towel that was manufactured under the FWF-controlled standards
and no additional money versus a towel without FWF-controlled manufacturing standards
and additional money. Monetary amounts varied from 0.25 to 12 euro in steps of 25 cents.
Subjects knew that one of their decisions would be randomly selected at the individual level
and implemented. That is, subjects received—in any case—a towel with the respective ethical
attributes from their choice in the price list and, depending on the choice, additional money.
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We defined the lowest monetary amount for which subjects still preferred no FWF certifi-
cate over the FWF certificate as the WTP for FWF certification. The lower the switch point,
the less a subject cared about FWF-certified working standards. In cases of multiple switching,
we used the mean switch point for our analysis. We observed that the results were robust to
multiple switching.
Fig 1 illustrates the price list in Product Organic. Product Control was similar except that
the cotton was conventional (see Appendix B in S1 Appendix. for details). After this main deci-
sion, subjects completed questionnaires on their political preferences, personal characteristics,
and socioeconomic background. We used standard tests of personality, such as the Big Five
[46], and of Machiavellianism [47] and the rather new Preference Survey Module [48]. At the
end of the study, approximately half an hour later, the instructions confronted subjects with
another ethically relevant decision. Subjects did not know this in advance, and therefore, com-
pared with the study of Gneezy et al. [40], subjects could not use the later sharing decisions as
a justification for selfish behavior in the towel decision. Through the computer screen, subjects
had to decide whether they wanted to share their show-up fee (i.e., 2 euro) with refugees from
a local refugee camp. We chose to implement a binary decision instead of a price list to distin-
guish this choice, also regarding its framing, from the previous decision on towels. The dona-
tion amount was substantial but not exceedingly high compared with the payout that subjects
could earn in the study, which comprised the show-up fee, a towel, and a potential payoff from
the price list. At this point, subjects had not received feedback on whether they would receive a
towel produced under the FWF or conventional production standards.
In the Belief treatments, that is, in Belief Control and in Belief Organic, subjects did not
make any ethically relevant product or donation decision themselves. Instead, subjects indi-
cated their expectations of subjects in the respective Product treatments behaved. We incentiv-
ized these estimates through quadratic scoring rules. The respective estimation for the mean




In Belief Control, subjects guessed the average WTP for controlled manufacturing stan-
dards in Product Control. Subjects in Belief Control knew the instructions from the Product
Fig 1. Price list as used in product organic. In the Organic Product treatment, subjects choose from a price list
between a towel without an FWF certificate and money versus a towel with an FWF certificate and no additional
money. The FWF certificate ensured controlled manufacturing standards for workers when sewing the towel. In any
case, the towel is made from organic cotton.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0227036.g001
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Control treatment for the towel decision. Thus, they had the exact same information as the
subjects in Product Control. After indicating their estimate, they also filled out the same ques-
tionnaires as subjects in the Product treatments. Then, the instructions confronted them with
a second estimation task, requiring them to guess what percentage of subjects in Control opted
to share their show-up fee with refugees. Again, we employed a quadratic scoring rule to
incentivize this task. The payout for the estimated willingness to share was max {5 - 1
5
(true–
guess)2, 0} euro. Subjects had to type in integer percentage values.
In Belief Organic, subjects accordingly guessed the behavior from Product Organic. In
total, subjects in Belief Control and in Belief Organic could earn up to 10 euro for good esti-
mates, in addition to a show-up fee of 7 euro.
The study took place at the Karlsruhe Decision and Design Laboratory (KD2 Lab) at the
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology. We used ORSEE [49] and hroot [50] to recruit 200 subjects
(50 subjects per treatment). Subjects were placed in separate cubicles. Instructions regarding
the towels were presented on paper, and questionnaires were presented on a computer screen
by using SoSci Survey [51]. See Appendix B in S1 Appendix for details.
Hypotheses
The insights gained from the experiments on moral self-licensing [36, 37, 38] and conscience
accounting [40] show that people use acquired moral credentials to justify less-ethical behavior
at a later point in time. In a similar fashion, they morally redeem themselves from unethical
behavior in the past by performing subsequent ethical deeds. Even if the ethical deeds are
small and cheap later on, they seem to serve as a good justification for rather selfish behavior at
an earlier point in time [40]. Gneezy et al. [40] asserted that a similar logic may have been
behind the sale of indulgences, as practiced by the Catholic Church in medieval times. Yet in
that case, moral redemption was often costly.
Moral cleansing may provoke a reduction in moral behavior in the first place, specifically if
subjects know about the possibility to morally cleanse themselves afterward [40]. Such a mech-
anism could also exist in the framework of a static decision across different ethically relevant
facets of one product. The satisfaction of fulfilling one ethical dimension could lead to a
decreased valuation of a second—though unrelated—ethical dimension at the same point in
time. This would imply that the time dimension is not what renders moral cleansing relevant;
instead, it is the opportunity to have some type of “moral excuse.” This logic would be specifi-
cally attractive if subjects did not care about consequences but instead considered all these
decisions relevant for one specific aspect about themselves, that is, a positive self-image [24, 25,
26]. Our first and main hypothesis is therefore that subjects in Product Organic have a lower
WTP for controlled manufacturing conditions than subjects in Product Control; thus, static
moral self-licensing exists.
Therefore, we expect that
WTPProduct Organic < WTPProduct Control:
In addition to the static product decision, subjects later had to make another unrelated ethi-
cal decision by choosing whether to share their show-up fee with local refugees. Because our
subjects do not receive any feedback on their payoff from the price list until after the experi-
ment, they know whether their towel is ethical in one dimension (the material) but cannot be
sure whether it was produced under controlled manufacturing conditions. (The exception is
subjects willing to pay the maximal amount or unwilling to pay the minimal amount for the
controlled manufacturing conditions.) In line with the findings on dynamic moral self-licens-
ing, the certainty of having acquired a product that fulfills (at least) one ethical facet in the first
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stage should “free” the subjects to behave less ethically afterward. This leads to our second
hypothesis: Subjects in Product Organic will be less likely to share their show-up fee than sub-
jects in Product Control, that is, static moral self-licensing and dynamic moral self-licensing
can exist next to each other:
DonationProduct Organic < DonationProduct Control:
Exploratively, we also investigate the incentivized beliefs of outsiders about the behavior of
subjects in the respective Product treatments. Thus, we conduct two Belief treatments: Belief
Control and Belief Organic. In these treatments, subjects do not face trade-offs between more
ethical decisions and money. Instead, they are incentivized to predict the decisions of other
subjects from the respective Product treatment.
It may be that subjects in the Belief treatments predict that moral self-licensing will take
place in the Product treatments. This is not so clear, however, for several reasons. First, sub-
jects in the Belief treatments do not face a trade-off between more ethical decisions and
money. In the literature, hypothetical questions and real behavior have often correlated
regarding altruistic versus selfish behavior. However, typically, in real behavior, subjects care
much more about their self-interest than when hypothetically asked. Accordingly, the litera-
ture on ethical consumption speaks of the famous 30:3 ratio [5] or attitude behavior gap[52,
53], comparing stated intent from questionnaires to real decisions in the market. Furthermore,
the literature has shown that context can affect morally relevant judgments (see e.g.,[16, 28, 29,
31, 34, 54, 55, 56]).
Therefore, we expect that
Belief WTP Product Organic � Belief WTP Product Control;
and accordingly
Belief Donation Product Organic � Belief Donation Product Control:
If subjects do not predict that moral self-licensing will take place, that is, if both formulas
hold with equality, emphasis on the importance of moral self-licensing in social and public
debate might be relevant.
Results
Static moral self-licensing
We hypothesized that static moral self-licensing takes place, that is, subjects treat orthogonal,
ethically relevant aspects as if they were substitutes in product choice. Therefore, we expected
that subjects in Product Organic would pay less money to ensure FWF-controlled manufactur-
ing standards than in Product Control, as reflected in a lower switch point in the price list. The
hypothesis was validated. In Product Control, the average switch point was 5.73 euro. We have
seven multiple switchers in the sample. Our findings remain robust if we exclude them or use
the first switch point, last switch-point, or median switch-point to approximate their willing-
ness to pay. (See the robustness checks in Appendix A in S1 Appendix. for details.) In Product
Organic, the average switch point and therefore WTP was 4.00 euro (Fig 2). This is a decrease
of 30% (p = 0.002, one-sided t test), which is highly significant. We will speak of “highly signifi-
cant” if the p value is below 0.01.
Subjects know from the instructions that sewing the towel is a very different production
step than growing the cotton because the people involved and ecological consequences differ.
Nevertheless, they attribute less value to guaranteeing minimum working standards when they
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know that their towel is made from organic cotton. Potentially, subjects already have a fairly
good moral conscience in the latter case and accordingly care less about the workers in
manufacturing. Thus, we find that static moral self-licensing exists.
Beliefs about static moral self-licensing
Do uninvolved people expect static moral self-licensing to take place? To consciously counter
the effects of static moral self-licensing, people must be aware of it. We hypothesized, that for
at least three reasons, this phenomenon may not be the case. Our data from Belief Organic
demonstrates that subjects are not aware of the effects of static moral self-licensing (Fig 3).
Estimates for switch points are at any conventional level and are virtually identical to those
from Belief Control (4.39 vs. 4.33, p = 0.89, two-sided t test).
Dynamic moral self-licensing
At the end of the study, approximately half an hour later, subjects in the Product treatments
were asked whether they wanted to share their show-up fee of 2 euros with refugees from a
local refugee camp. Subjects did not know beforehand that they would be confronted with this
decision. If static moral self-licensing has spillovers in time, subjects in Product Organic
should less frequently share their show-up fee with refugees than subjects in Product Control,
and this is what we observed (Fig 4): 72% of subjects are willing to share in Product Control,
and 56% of subjects are willing to share in Product Organic (p = 0.048, one-sided test of pro-
portions). As subjects in Product Organic could expect to leave with a higher income than sub-
jects in Product Control because of the higher costs of organic textiles, they may be even more
inclined to donate. The data display the opposite effect, and this demonstrates that the effects
of dynamic moral self-licensing may be stronger than this potential income effect.
Looking into the estimates from the two Belief treatments (Fig 5), there is again no signifi-
cant difference in estimates of willingness to share with refugees for the two Product
Fig 2. WTP product treatments. In Product Organic, subjects pay highly significantly less money to ensure controlled
manufacturing standards compared with Product Control. Thus, static moral self-licensing takes place.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0227036.g002
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treatments (65% in Belief Organic vs. 67% in Belief Control, p = 0.68, two-sided t test). Outsid-
ers therefore neither expect static nor dynamic moral self-licensing.
In summary, although the effects of moral self-licensing with regard to specific ethical
dimensions are pronounced within decisions and over time, uninvolved parties do not antici-
pate their effects. This occurs even though uninvolved parties were monetarily incentivized
Fig 3. Estimated WTP belief treatments. In the Belief treatments, subjects guess the average WTP for controlled
manufacturing in Product Organic, resp. Product Control. The data displays no significant difference in estimates at
any conventional level. Thus, subjects in Belief Organic are not aware that static moral self-licensing may take place.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0227036.g003
Fig 4. Willingness to share product treatments. Subjects in Product Organic are significantly less likely to share their
show-up fee of euro with local refugees than subjects in Product Control.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0227036.g004
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and could earn much more money from making accurate guesses than from the flat payment
they received for participating in the study. Many subjects’ beliefs were far from the correct
answer such that they did not earn additional money for this task. 27% of subjects earned
money for their estimates. Potentially, subjects in the Belief treatments merely indicate what
they consider morally appropriate and do not figure in the effects of moral self-attribution.
Subjects in Belief Control underestimated the willingness to pay in Product Control
(p = 0.018, two-sided t test) but do not underestimate subjects’ willingness to donate to
refugees.
Discussion
In the following, we discuss our results. First, we demonstrate robustness by controlling for
sociodemographic variables, personality traits, and attitudes toward refugees across Product
treatments. Second, we discuss whether self-attribution is critical to our results. For this pur-
pose, we run two new treatments that demonstrate that self-attribution seems to matter signifi-
cantly. Third, we discuss the potential effects of decreasing attention in subjects and an
alternative interpretation of why subjects pay less for certified working conditions in Product
Organic. Fourth, we stress the need for follow-up research.
First, subjects were randomly assigned to treatments. This was also the case for the Product
treatments. Nevertheless, a concern might be that treatment effects may be driven by differ-
ences in age or demographic background; reassuringly, Table 1 demonstrates that this is not
the case. Subjects in Product Control and Product Organic do not significantly differ in age
(p = 0.22, two-sided t test) or gender (p = 0.65, two-sided test of proportions). Furthermore,
subjects have comparable amounts of money at their monthly disposal (p = 0.77, two-sided t
test) and state no significant differences in their concern for their financial situation (p = 0.20,
two-sided t test). In addition, subjects have similar opinions on whether Germany should sup-
port refugees fleeing war (p = 0.66, two-sided t test), political, religious or ethnic persecution
Fig 5. Estimated willingness to share belief treatments. Estimates from subjects in the Belief treatments for average
willingness to share in the respective Product treatment.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0227036.g005
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(p = 0.65, two-sided t test), hunger, insufficient nourishment or natural disasters (p = 0.39,
two-sided t test), or unemployment (p = 082, two-sided t test).
Regarding personality traits, we elicit measures that might influence ethical decision-mak-
ing: Machiavellianism and agreeableness. Machiavellianism encompasses a variety of world
views and actions characterized by a general disregard for other people to increase personal
gain. Machiavellianism has been found to correlate negatively with ethical orientation and
decision-making [54]. Machiavellianism has furthermore been positively linked to love for
money [57] and economic opportunism[58]. Sacrificing money to improve the working condi-
tions of unknown people without personal benefit would therefore not constitute Machiavel-
lian behavior. The second trait of interest is agreeableness, and it is elicited in the Big Five.
Agreeableness encompasses positive personal attitudes and behaviors, such as generosity,
trustworthiness, and compassion [59, 60]. We find that subjects in Product Control and Prod-
uct Organic show similar levels of Machiavellianism (p = 0.47, two-sided t test) and agreeable-
ness (p = 0.37, two-sided t test). These similarities in sociodemographics and personality traits
suggest that differences across Product treatments are based on other factors, that is, differ-
ences in decision contexts.
Second, a question could be whether self-attribution is critical for the treatment effect we
observe in the Product treatments. An argument could be made for an alternative driver, that
is, subjects’ utility functions are concave regarding fulfilling separate ethical dimensions of
products. This could imply a lower marginal utility in the organic treatment and lead to a
lower WTP in Product Organic compared with Product Control. A related argument could be
that subjects in Product Organic bunched the ethical attributes differently and therefore
became less willing to pay for the certified sewing conditions (we thank an anonymous referee
for pointing this out). If subjects in Product Organic consider the organic cotton and certified
sewing conditions as part of one ethical factor, this could reduce their willingness to pay for
the individual certificates, although they address very diffferent ethical aspects from a conse-
quentialist viewpoint.
Thus, a question arises as to whether self-attribution significantly affected our results. Do
people indeed need self-attribution to find some minimal yet plausible excuse to pay less in
Product Organic? This question motivated us to run two additional treatments: Lottery Con-
trol and Lottery Organic. These treatments are similar to the original product choice treat-
ments, respectively, with only one difference: much less room for self-attribution. The
instructions stress that it is perfectly random regarding whether a subject decides about towels
made from conventional or organic cotton. In this manner, subjects deciding about organic
towels may attribute the fulfillment of this ethically relevant criterion less to themselves.
Table 1. Comparison of subjects in product control and product organic.
Product Control Product Organic p value
Age † 21.82 21.06 0.22
Proportion of males ‡ 76% 72% 0.65
Disposable income after rent (in euro) † 410 398 0.77
Financial concern (7-point Likert-scale) † 2.58 2.80 0.20
Machiavellianism † 56.88 58.06 0.47
Agreeableness † 12.9 12.4 0.37
The sociodemographics and the ethically relevant personality traits do not differ significantly between Product Control and Product Organic.
† two-sided t test, n = 100
‡ two-sided test of proportions, n = 100.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0227036.t001
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Accordingly, fulfilling this criterion may not serve as a morally relevant excuse anymore, such
that subjects may care more about the upgrade to the fair wear certificate and about donating
to refugees. These two treatments were run 19 months after the original Product treatments
with 50 subjects per treatment. Unfortunately, we had to exclude one subject (in Lottery Con-
trol) due to incorrect handling of the price list.
In Lottery Control and Lottery Organic, the randomness is made salient to subjects as fol-
lows. Blue and yellow cards are alternatingly handed to subjects. Next, all subjects within a ses-
sion receive the same information on the chain of production of textile products, on FWF
standards, and on organic cotton production (as in the original Product treatments). Subjects
learn that a random coin toss and the color of their card determine whether they subsequently
decide about towels made of conventional or organic cotton. Thus, the design renders the fol-
lowing salient: subjects are randomly distributed to one of the two treatments: Lottery Control
or Lottery Organic. After the coin toss, subjects receive their respective price lists and instruc-
tions (see Appendix II for details). In contrast, in the original Product treatments, assignment
to the specific treatment was random. This randomness was neither stressed nor visually
demonstrated.
If self-attribution matters, we expect that both moral self-licensing effects should be less
pronounced in the Lottery treatments. The following simple model describes the approach.
We capture the self-attribution from fulfilling the ethically relevant cotton criterion in the
Product Organic treatment through α. In Product Control, in which towels are never made
from ethically produced cotton, we set α to 0. In the Lottery treatments, we assume that it is a
2
because subjects know that fulfilling the organic cotton criterion is random and has a probabil-
ity of 50%. In Product Organic, α is 1.
We assume that utility is separable between the moral and the monetary dimensions, and
quasilinear in monetary payments. Utility from receiving a monetary amount m and having a
moral value of α is thus given by u(α)+m. We assume that u is three times continuously differ-
entiable. The monetary amount m�(α) that renders the agent indifferent between receiving
money or receiving an additional moral value of f is given by m�(α) = u(α+f)−u(α)
Writing this as














In particular, under risk aversion, u00<0, m� is decreasing in α. Moreover, if the agent is
prudent in the sense of Kimball [61] in the moral dimension, u000>0, then m� is convex. Con-
versely, imprudence, u000<0 implies the concavity of m�.






















that is, m� a2
  �
is closer to m�(α) than to m�(0). In the imprudent case, m� a2
  �
is closer to m�(0)
than to m�(α).
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In the Lottery treatments, self-attribution of the morally relevant organic cotton should
amount to the same value a
2
. Therefore, the WTP for a second, morally relevant criterion
should be comparable across the two Lottery treatments. Indeed, the data shows that WTP is
statistically comparable.
In Lottery Organic, the average WTP for controlled manufacturing conditions is 5.49 euro,
and it is 4.86 euro (p = 0.30, two-sided t test) in Lottery Control (Fig 6). As hypothesized, the
moral self-licensing effect disappears.
Analogously to the Product treatments, all subjects in the Lottery treatments were offered
to share their show-up fee of 2 euro with local refugees. The share of subjects willing to donate
is 66% in Lottery Organic and 62% in Lottery Control (Fig 7). In accordance with the hypothe-
sis, the difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.68, two-sided test of proportions). The
results suggest that moral self-attribution differs if the role of randomness in the experiment is
emphasized.
A direct comparison to the original Product treatments, elicited 19 months earlier, must be
used with some caution because, of course, ethical values in the population of interest may
change over time. Notably, the general attitude toward refugees could have changed substan-
tially between the sessions, which is why we refrain from conducting comparisons between the
willingness to share between the Product and the Lottery treatments. Reassuringly though,
when we ask our subjects whether Germany should support refugees fleeing from different
causes, comparing the Product and the Lottery treatments, we find no significant differences.
This is valid whether refugees are fleeing war (p = 0.96, two-sided t test), political, religious or
ethnic persecution (p = 0.30, two-sided t test), hunger, insufficient nourishment or natural
disasters (p = 0.37, two-sided t test), or unemployment (p = 0.21, two-sided t test).We find that
compared with the original Product treatments, the average WTP for controlled manufactur-
ing conditions does not change (p = 0.47, two-sided t test). When examining at the organic
Fig 6. WTP lottery treatments. In the Lottery treatments, the static moral self-licensing effect disappears because
there are no significant differences in the WTP for controlled manufacturing conditions. If anything, the pattern
reverses based on a tendency.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0227036.g006
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treatments only, however, subjects in Lottery Organic are willing to pay significantly more
than subjects in Product Organic (5.49 euro vs. 4.00 euro, p = 0.01, two-sided t test). This find-
ing is another indication that subjects care more about additional, ethically relevant facets if it
is more difficult to attribute the fulfillment of the ethically relevant criterion regarding organic
cotton to themselves.
Third, an argument could be that other drivers could play a critical role in the original
Product treatments or that the effects in the Product treatments could be driven by decreasing
attention when reading the instructions. Maybe, subjects no longer focus on what other ethical
upgrades are possible for a towel once they learn of the first aspect (cotton production). Like-
wise, subjects may have not paid attention to the later donation decisions. However, as a driver
of the differences across the Product treatments, this seems unlikely. Notably, instructions
were identical in length across Product treatments. All subjects learned about cotton produc-
tion first, then about the conditions in the sewing sector, and then (approximately half an hour
later) about the donation opportunity.
Fourth, further research in different contexts is necessary to explore how general the moral
self-licensing effects are that we documented in our study. Of course, as the first step, further
research could also vary the design we used, that is, allow subjects to decide about certified cot-
ton instead of the Fair Wear certification. Another important follow-up focus could be market
analyses because maybe for firms, offering products that fulfill exactly one ethical criterion, for
example, ecological cotton in textile items, is a smart strategy for selling products to customers
with easy-to-ease ethical concerns. A further possibility is that leaving moral wiggle room (see
Dana et al. [62], van der Weele [63], Bartling et al. [64], Grossman [65], Grossman and van der
Weele [66], Freddi [67], Serra-Garcia and Szech [68], and Golman et al. [69] for a recent over-
view) and/or room for motivated reasoning [70, 71] could further decrease morally responsible
behavior in customers. This potential interaction of moral self-licensing and other well-known
mechanisms providing moral excuses is also a topic for further research.
Fig 7. Willingness to share lottery treatments. Compared with the Product treatments, the share of donations is
statistically comparable between subjects in the organic and the control treatment. The effects of dynamic moral self-
licensing disappear in the Lottery treatments.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0227036.g007
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Conclusion
Our data documents that people behave as if there was strong substitutive relations between
ethically relevant, non-correlated product dimensions. Our data thus suggest that static moral
self-licensing exists. Fulfilling one ethical dimension in a product choice seems to ease moral
conscience in a later, unrelated yet morally relevant context. Thus, different aspects of moral
self-licensing and static (across morally relevant dimensions at one point in time) over differ-
ent points in time seem to coexist.
Outsiders were not observed to infer that moral self-licensing could occur. Although mone-
tarily incentivized to make accurate estimates, subjects were observed to be completely oblivi-
ous to effects of moral self-licensing, both static and dynamic. Therefore, it may have value for
social and political debates on the potential effects of moral self-licensing. Firms know better
than ordinary customers about effects of moral self-licensing and other mechanisms of moral
excuses. Providing such excuses to customers may be a profitable approach. If so, political and
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